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We analyze the price competition between two suppliers o®ering two di®erent lead times and two di®erent
prices to a buyer. The buyer chooses its inventory replenishment policy in order to minimize its in¯nite-
horizon average cost. In essence, the fast and expensive supplier is used only in emergencies, while the
slow and cheap supplier receives the bulk of the orders. Thus, despite a higher price, the fast supplier is
able to capture a part of the buyer's orders. We analyze the price competition between the asymmetric
suppliers, where the market share of each supplier is derived from the buyer's inventory problem. We ¯nd
equilibria that di®er signi¯cantly from the Bertrand price-only competition. In particular, for some cost
parameters, the fast supplier is able to charge a premium for faster delivery, and stay in business even
with a higher production cost. We obtain in some cases closed-form formulas for the price di®erence in
equilibrium. Hence, our results show that high cost suppliers may not be driven out of business if they can
o®er fast delivery.
1 Introduction
Globalization of the economy has had tremendous consequences for many companies around the world.
The major e®ects have been observed in manufacturing, e.g., textiles or electronics, where a large volume
of production has moved from high cost countries, such as the United States, Germany or France, to low
cost regions, such as China, Vietnam, or Eastern European countries.
Of course, for companies based in higher cost areas such as Western Europe or the United States, facing
new competition from low cost countries has been a challenge di±cult to overcome. As a result, many of
these ¯rms have moved their own facilities to low cost countries as it seemed the only way of remaining
competitive.
However, by moving to low cost countries, these companies have also given up an important competitive
attribute: typically, they have moved from locations close to the ¯nal market, to far-away countries, which
are weeks away from the customers. Implicitly, these companies have assumed that the lead time advantage
was not as valuable as the cost advantage.
1These actions seem to imply that in the new competitive landscape, cost is the only important attribute
to consider. The economics literature has developed some game-theoretic price competition models that
support this view of the world. Most relevant is the Bertrand price competition framework, see Tirole [17]
or Vives [19] for references. In this setting, two ¯rms compete in price for a market demand. When the two
¯rms have identical costs, the only equilibrium is that both ¯rms price at marginal cost, share the total
demand, and thus make zero pro¯ts. This is the so-called Bertrand paradox. A more realistic use of this
model is to examine the asymmetric case, when one ¯rm has lower costs than the other. Here, the most
competitive supplier captures the market, at an equilibrium price equal to the cost of the less competitive
supplier. This is what seems to be observed in the o®shoring trend. These models can be extended to
take lead time into account, by adding a cost penalty to the slow supplier. However, by doing this, the
equilibrium result is similar to the Bertrand outcome: one supplier captures all the market and drives the
least competitive suppliers out of business.
In some industries, however, we can observe suppliers located in high cost countries coexisting with
low-cost competitors. In these situations, the lead time advantage must certainly be considered, as it
allows companies to serve the market better. For instance, fast-retailing companies such as Zara have
demonstrated that sourcing close to the market can provide a crucial competitive advantage. Zara can
achieve very fast response to market trends by using suppliers in Spain, Portugal and Northern Africa.
Zara's suppliers are probably more expensive than competitors located in Asia, but their short lead time
makes them Zara's ¯rst choice.
Other companies, such as the German retailer Adidas, also take advantage of lead time in their supply.
Adidas may work with two suppliers: one in China and another one in Germany. Having two suppliers
helps Adidas react to demand variability better (with the reactivity of the German supplier) and obtain
good prices (by giving volume to the Chinese supplier). This example shows that the German supplier,
Trigema [9], can be competitive o®ering fast service and high price.
Obviously, such a situation cannot be explained with a Bertrand-like competition model, where the
winner takes all. Indeed, Adidas' case shows that it is possible to obtain the bene¯ts of both low cost and
high °exibility by using multiple sourcing. Concentrating supply in a single source limits the production
°exibility that the buyer can obtain: by using a unique supplier, the buyer commits to a single production
technology, which is typically cheap but rigid, or expensive and °exible. To alleviate this e®ect, many
companies resort to dual sourcing. Like Adidas, the buyer can then use the fast and expensive supplier
in emergencies, while the slow and cheap supplier receives the bulk of the orders. Under this buyer's
2behavior, it is clear that, despite a higher price, the fast supplier is able to capture a part of the buyer's
orders. Faster lead time hence provides an opportunity for high cost suppliers to be competitive and stay
in business.
The purpose of this paper is thus to provide a model of supplier competition where this lead time
advantage is properly taken into account. This requires using a dual sourcing inventory management
model. We analyze explicitly the buyer's inventory management policy to characterize the market share
that the fast supplier can capture, despite a higher price. We then turn to analyzing the duopoly pricing
game between fast and slow suppliers. We ask the following questions. First, can the fast supplier achieve
a positive share of the market even though it has higher cost? Second, in equilibrium, what is the price
premium, if any, that it can charge, compared to the slow supplier?
Our model consists of an in¯nite-horizon periodic-review inventory replenishment problem. The buyer
faces a stochastic i.i.d. demand at each period, and can replenish its inventory by placing orders with two
suppliers, each o®ering a di®erent lead time and a di®erent price to the buyer. We assume that there is
no ¯xed cost associated with ordering from any of the two suppliers. The buyer minimizes its long-run
average cost by placing appropriate orders with each supplier. This minimization results in a splitting of
the market between the suppliers.
Knowing this splitting, each supplier chooses a static price for the component that maximizes its long-
term average pro¯t, given its cost and its lead time quotation. We analyze the pure-strategy equilibrium
pricing strategies of the suppliers.
Of course, we could give the suppliers the freedom to adjust prices as a function of the buyer's current
stocking position. In a situation of potential shortage, the fast supplier, being the only supplier that can
save the buyer from a stock-out, would raise the price of the component and use its temporarily increased
negotiation power. Studying this behavior would require a complex model that monitors the quality of
buyer-supplier relationships. Instead, we choose to study a static price game, where it is assumed that
suppliers do not take advantage of the buyer's situation. In practice, this may correspond to long-term
price agreements between suppliers and buyer. Within this framework, our model is able to capture the
intrinsic advantages of a fast-response supplier.
We ¯nd that for some cost parameters, the asymmetric Bertrand equilibrium remains the only equilib-
rium of our game. However, we also characterize situations where the fast supplier captures a positive share
of the market. Our model thus identi¯es competitive equilibria that are very di®erent in nature to the ones
identi¯ed by traditional price-only competition. Finally, we ¯nd that in some cases, no equilibrium exists.
3In any case, we observe that the demand distribution has a direct impact in the nature of competition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing literature. We present the
model in Section 3. We ¯rst analyze the buyer's inventory problem in Section 4. Section 5 presents
general equilibrium results for general market splitting functions. These are applied to two cases. First,
in Section 6, we analyze the duopoly competition when the lead time di®erence is equal to the review
period, and obtain closed form results when the lead times are 0 and 1. Second, in Section 7, we develop
an approximated market splitting function and characterize the di®erent equilibrium cases. Finally, in
Section 8, we summarize our results and discuss possible extensions of the model.
2 Literature Review
Our model considers competition between suppliers in a context of inventory management, where price
together with lead time is taken into account.
A ¯rst stream of literature related to this work considers sourcing with multiple suppliers taking into
account price and another attribute, such as quality, yields or credit risk. Minner [12] reviews several
motivations for supplier diversi¯cation. The objective is to understand how this additional attribute
a®ects the buyer's pro¯t or utility function. These models typically derive appropriate operating policies,
by identifying the ordering policies that the buyer should use with each supplier. Speci¯cally, when this
is applied to the case of dual sourcing, the key question for the buyer is how to split orders between the
suppliers.
One of the main attributes that has been considered in the literature is supplier yield. That is, when
suppliers are not fully reliable and deliver only a fraction of their orders, then supplier diversi¯cation can
be bene¯cial in order to reduce yield uncertainty. This approach is motivated by quality problems or
response-time uncertainties. Gerchak and Parlar [8], Anupindi and Akella [2], and Parlar and Wang [15]
discuss the optimal diversi¯cation policy for the buyer, i.e., its optimal replenishment strategy. In a similar
line, when there is a chance that a supplier goes out of business, using dual sourcing reduces the risk of a
supply disruption, see Tomlin [18], Federgruen and Yang [5] and Babich et al. [3].
Closest to this paper is a set of papers that consider lead time and price attributes, see Allon and
Federgruen [1] and references therein. These papers use queuing theory to model lead time. Our paper
follows an approach similar to the papers presented above, with the di®erence that we specify lead time
explicitly (and not as the outcome of server congestion). This is more realistic for situations where lead
time is related to transportation. There, capacity is seldom restrictive and uncertainty in transportation
4time is minimal. The focus is also di®erent. We start by determining the buyer's behavior when facing two
competing suppliers with di®erent price and lead time combinations, and use it to analyze the competitive
interaction between the suppliers through price.
In addition to the papers cited above, we make use of the literature of inventory management with
multiple procurement modes. It is well-known, from Fukuda [7], that when the lead time di®erence between
the suppliers is equal to 1, then a double base-stock policy is optimal for the buyer. However, when the
lead time di®erence is greater than 1, the optimal replenishment policies do not exhibit the base-stock
property anymore, see Feng et al. [6] and Whittemore and Saunders [20]. In this paper, we assume that
the buyer uses a double base-stock policy, that, despite being sub-optimal, is commonly used in double
sourcing practices. Intuitively, by using a static base-stock policy, the bulk of the procurement comes
from the distant and cheap supplier, and only when the inventory level is dangerously low (i.e., below the
corresponding base-stock target), the fast and expensive supplier is called in. A similar heuristic approach
has been extensively used in the literature: impose a given simple policy, and ¯nd the corresponding optimal
or near-optimal parameters, see for instance Moinzadeh and Nahmias [13], Moinzadeh and Schmidt [14] or
Tagaras and Vlachos [16].
Finally, our work is related to pricing too. In a single period monopoly setting, the optimal pricing policy
has been studied in Lariviere and Porteus [10], where a supplier is selling to a newsvendor. Introducing
competition complicates the nature of the analysis, and uses more intensively game theory. Our work is
thus related to the huge body of research in economics concerned with oligopoly pricing, and in particular
duopoly pricing. The book by Vives [19] reviews most models in that area, from Bertrand to Cournot
competition. This paper falls within the category of price-competition models with asymmetric ¯rms. In
the economics literature, the Bertrand model with asymmetric costs is the closest work to our model. The
main di®erence is that in our case, the demand is split between the two suppliers that charge di®erent
prices. In contrast, in the Bertrand model, when a ¯rm charges a higher price than its competitor, then
its market share is zero.
3 The General Model
Consider a buyer that needs to purchase a component for the ¯nal product, in a in¯nite-horizon periodic-
review environment. Demand for the component is stochastic. Customers arriving at time t = 1;:::;1 are
served from stock, or, if on-hand inventory is not su±cient, unserved items are back-ordered. We denote
by Dt the demand from period t, and we assume that demands are independent identically distributed and
5within the support [Dmin;Dmax] ½ [0;1). Let F(q) = P(Dt ¸ q) and D the average demand. We assume
that F is twice di®erentiable, and F




The component may be obtained from two di®erent suppliers, a local supplier, 1, and an o®shore
supplier, 2. Of course, these two suppliers di®er not only by the prices they charge, but also by their lead
times. We assume, without loss of generality, that the local supplier has a lead time L1 ¸ 0 while the
o®shore supplier needs a time L2 > L1 to serve the buyer. That is, when an order is placed at supplier i
at the end of period t (after demand at t is realized), it is received at the beginning of period t + Li + 1
(before the demand at t + Li + 1 is realized).
We denote by p1;p2 the price that these two suppliers charge for one unit of component. Of course,
if p1 · p2, it is clear that the buyer should always source from the cheaper and faster supplier. However,
when p1 > p2, the optimal policy can be to source from both suppliers.
The sequence of events is the following. First, the suppliers set long-run static prices p1 and p2. Then,
the buyer determines its optimal long-run replenishment policy. We are ultimately interested in the price
competition between suppliers, and for this purpose, we analyze the buyer's behavior ¯rst.
4 The Buyer's Inventory Problem
The buyer's objective is to serve demand at minimum long-run average cost. Three factors contribute to
cost:
² the cost of items purchased at supplier 1;
² the cost of items purchased at supplier 2; and
² the inventory holding and back-ordering cost.
We model the holding and back-ordering cost as a piecewise linear function h(¢). Speci¯cally, h(q) =
hinv ¢ q, when q ¸ 0, where hinv ¸ 0 is the per-unit holding cost; and h(q) = ¡hbo ¢ q, when q · 0, where
hbo ¸ 0 is the per-unit back-ordering cost. This choice of cost function is standard in inventory models. As
a matter of fact, the analysis could be performed for a more general function h(¢), that should be convex.
The supply °ow in the chain is modeled as follows. For each time period t, we de¯ne the inventory
position j, Y
j
t , as the total of the inventory on-hand plus all the standing orders due before t + j. These
6include all the orders placed before t, but not yet received. Thus, Y 0
t represents the inventory on-hand
(negative is there is backlogged demand), Y 1
t the sum of Y 0
t plus the arrivals of the next day, and so on.






























































t are the ordering quantities placed in t at suppliers 1 and 2 respectively. We see that when
supplier 1 has lead time L1 = 0, this corresponds to replenishment orders that are ful¯lled immediately,
i.e., before the next demand arrives.
Given the prices p1 and p2, let (q1(Yt);q2(Yt)) be a Markov replenishment policy, among which we ¯nd
the optimal one. The average cost of the buyer using that policy can be written as
C(q1;q2) = p1E[q1(Y )] + p2E[q2(Y )] + Eh(Y 0)
= (p1 ¡ p2)E[q1(Y )] + p2
¡
E[q1(Y )] + E[q2(Y )]
¢
+ E[h(Y 0)];
where Y is the steady-state distribution of Yt using the policy (q1;q2). Any policy that yields a ¯nite
average cost should satisfy E[q1(Y )] + E[q2(Y )] = D, for stability. Thus, any candidate for the optimal
policy, we must have
C(q1;q2) = (p1 ¡ p2)E[q1(Y )] + p2D + E[h(Y 0)]: (1)
This implies a very important property: the optimal policy will depend only on
¢ := p1 ¡ p2; (2)






the fraction of orders going to supplier 1, i.e., its average market share, under the buyer's optimal replen-
ishment policy. The fraction of orders going to supplier 2 is simply ®2(¢) = 1 ¡ ®1(¢).
7Figure 1: Summary of the inventory position at times t (left) and t + 1 (right).
8One direct property is that when ¢ = 0, the buyer should source only from the fast supplier, i.e.,
®1(0) = 1. In addition, when ¢ ¸ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo, the buyer is better o® buying from the slow supplier and
stocking out, rather than buying from the fast supplier. Thus it should source only from the slow supplier,
i.e., ®1((L2 ¡ L1)hbo) = 0. In addition, it is clear that ®1 is non-increasing.
Figure 2 shows an example of the shape of the market share function ®1, an output of the buyer's
inventory problem. We consider a normal demand distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation of 0:3,
inventory and back-ordering cost hinv = 1 and hbo = 9 respectively, and lead times L1 = 2 and L2 = 3.
Notice that when ¢ ! 0, the market share of the fast supplier goes to 100%, i.e., ®1 ! 1.










































f®1(¢) as a function of ¢, for L1 = 2 and L2 = 3.
Notice that for any combination (L1;L2), ®1(¢) can only be characterized by solving the buyer's
minimization problem. The optimal inventory policy in the general case is known to have a complex
structure, see Whittemore and Saunders [20]. However, when L2 = L1 + 1, Fukuda [7] ¯rst showed that
using a double base-stock replenishment policy was optimal. Not only the class of double base-stock policies
is optimal when L2 = L1 + 1, but also, when L2 > L1 + 1, its performance is close to the optimum, as
shown in Tagaras and Vlachos [16]. Moreover, its simplicity makes it an attractive candidate for companies
to implement.
9The characterization of ®1 using double base-stock policies is the focus of Sections 6 and 7. However,
before analyzing this in detail, we de¯ne the duopoly price competition and obtain some results that depend
on the structure of ®1. For this purpose, we focus on the suppliers' strategies.
5 Duopoly Prices in Equilibrium
We assume that the suppliers incur a cost c1;c2 respectively per unit of component shipped to the buyer.
Of course, in order to earn pro¯ts, the suppliers declare a price that is higher than their true cost. We
compute the pro¯ts of each one of the suppliers (we scale it down by the average demand). Supplier 1's
pro¯t is hence
¦1(p1;p2) = (p1 ¡ c1)®1;
while supplier 2's pro¯t can be expressed as
¦2(p1;p2) = (p2 ¡ c2)(1 ¡ ®1):
We study the Nash equilibria of the game in pure strategies. Our model resembles the classical Bertrand





1 when ¢ < 0
1
2
when ¢ = 0
0 when ¢ > 0:
With this demand splitting scheme, equilibrium exists, and is unique such that p1 = c1;p2 = c1 ¡ ² > c2
(an ²-equilibrium).
In our model, on the other hand, ®1 is the outcome of the buyer's optimization problem, given the
price di®erence ¢ = p1 ¡p2. It can be observed that ®1(0) = 1 and decreases to zero with ¢. The central
question here is to determine whether equilibrium exists, and if so, whether it is unique. Of course, the
answer to this question depends crucially on the shape of the function ®1.
























¸ ¡(1 ¡ ®1)
d2®1
d¢2 : (5)
10This is simply a reformulation of the ¯rst and second-order conditions. Notice, however, that, unless
we show concavity of the pro¯t function of each supplier, the second-order conditions do not guarantee
that the selected price is a global maximizer of pro¯t. Thus, we need to conduct a more thorough analysis
of the pro¯t functions. For this purpose, we identify properties of ®1 that yield equilibrium results.
Lemma 2 If ®1 is convex in (0;(L2 ¡ L1)hbo), then the pro¯t function ¦2 is pseudo-concave in p2 2
(p1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo;p1).
All the proofs are contained in the appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that the pro¯t of the slow supplier, 2, is well-behaved when ®1 is convex. It turns
out that this property is satis¯ed by most usual distributions, see Lemma 7 in the next section. With this
property, we can characterize the best-response price p2 to a price p1.
Lemma 3 When ®1 is convex in (0;(L2 ¡ L1)hbo), then the best-response p¤
2(p1) has the following char-
acteristics: there are 0 · a2 · e2 such that
² when p1 · c2, then p¤
2(p1) = c2;
² when c2 < p1 · c2 + a2, p¤
2(p1) = p1 ¡ ² with ² positive very small;
² when c2+a2 < p1 · c2+e2, p¤
2 is continuous and non-decreasing in p1, but with a slope smaller than
1;
² when c2 + e2 < p1, p¤
2(p1) = p1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo.
Thus, p¤
2 is non-decreasing, continuous everywhere, with slope between 0 and 1, except at p1 = c2 + e2,
where it jumps up.
We can see that there are four main cases for the slow supplier: either exit the market by pricing higher
than the fast supplier; or settle for the deterministic part of demand only, i.e., ®2(0+), which may or may
not be zero, by pricing marginally below the fast supplier; or undercut the fast supplier to capture market
share; or push the fast supplier out of the market by setting a much smaller price p1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo. The
four cases are illustrated in Figure 3 (left).







is convex in (0;(L2 ¡ L1)hbo), then the pro¯t function ¦1 is pseudo-concave in p1 2




is convex in (0;(L2 ¡ L1)hbo), then the best-response p¤
1(p2) has the following char-
acteristics: there are ¡(L2 ¡ L1)hbo · a1 · e1 such that
² when p2 · c1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo, then p¤
1(p2) = c1;
² when c1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo < p2 · c1 + a1, p¤
1(p2) = p2 + (L2 ¡ L1)hbo ¡ ² with ² positive very small;
² when c1 +a1 < p2 · c1 +e1, p¤
1 is continuous in p2, with a slope smaller than 1 (may be decreasing);
² when c1 + e1 < p2, p¤
1(p2) = p2.
Thus, p¤
1 is continuous everywhere except at p2 = c1 + e1 possibly, where it jumps down. When ®1 is
continuous at ¢ = 0, then p¤
1 is continuous everywhere.
Similarly as with Lemma 3, we obtain four cases. These are illustrated in Figure 3(right).



































































































Figure 3: Shape of the best-response functions p¤
2(p1) (left) and p¤
1(p2) (right). Notice that the intermediate
part, where p¤
i = p0
i continuous, is here increasing, but it is not necessarily so for p¤
1 as we see in Section 6.
However, it turns out that in some regular cases (see next section), the function
1
®1
is not convex, but




is concave in (0;(L2 ¡L1)hbo), then the best-response p¤
1(p2) has the following char-
acteristics: there are ¡(L2 ¡ L1)hbo · e1 such that
12² when p2 · c1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo, then p¤
1(p2) = c1;
² when c1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo < p2 · c1 + e1, p¤
1(p2) = p2 + (L2 ¡ L1)hbo ¡ ² with ² positive very small;
² when c1 + e1 < p2, p¤
1(p2) = p2.
Thus, p¤
1 is continuous everywhere except at p2 = c1 + e1, where it jumps down.
We observe that the structure of the best-response function is identical to the one identi¯ed in Lemma
5, with a1 = e1. In addition, here there is a discontinuity even when ®1 is continuous.
Given the best-response functions, we are able to characterize the equilibrium of the pricing game.
Theorem 1 When ®1 is convex and
1
®1





2 ) of the pricing game if and only if one of the following situations is satis¯ed:
1. c1 ¡ c2 · ¡e1, i.e., the slow supplier is so expensive that the fast supplier's best option is to price it





2. e2 · c1 ¡ c2, i.e., the fast supplier is so expensive that the slow supplier's best option is to price it
out of the market, i.e., p
eq
1 = c1 and p
eq
2 = c1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo.
3. lim
²!0+ p¤
1(c1 +e1 ¡²)¡(c1 +e1) · (c2 +e2)¡ lim
²!0+ p¤
2(c2 +e2 ¡²), i.e., the fast and slow suppliers can
coexist and o®er di®erentiated prices.
In any of these cases, the equilibrium is unique.
Thus, the theorem completely characterizes the types of equilibrium of the game. In any other situation,
there is no equilibrium. There are three possible cases. In the ¯rst two cases, c1¡c2 · ¡e1, or c1¡c2 ¸ e2.
These are situations where the cost di®erential of a supplier is too large to be competitive. The third case
corresponds to an equilibrium with a stable price premium of the fast supplier over the slow supplier. The




is concave, we have that lim
²!0+ p¤
1(c1 + e1 ¡ ²) ¡ (c1 + e1) = (L2 ¡ L1)hbo >
(c2 + e2) ¡ lim
²!0+ p¤
2(c2 + e2 ¡ ²); and thus the last case can never occur.
On the other hand, when
1
®1
is convex, ®1 is continuous at ¢ = 0, and hbo ! 1, the last case occurs
for some c1;c2. Indeed, in that case, the best-response functions are continuous, e2 ! 1, lim
²!0+(c2 + e2) ¡
p¤
2(c2 + e2 ¡ ²) ! +1, while lim
²!0+ p¤
1(c1 + e1 ¡ ²) ¡ (c1 + e1) is ¯nite.
13Hence, we have identi¯ed two types of stable outcomes: either one supplier clearly dominates the other
and captures the entire market; or both suppliers can coexist in competition, price di®erently and capture
a portion of the market. Finally, it is also possible that no equilibrium exists. Being in one situation or
another depends (1) on the cost parameters of the suppliers and the inventory costs hbo;hinv; and (2) on
the demand distribution.
6 Exact Characterization when L2 = L1 + 1
In this section, we characterize ®1 exactly for L2 = L1 + 1. This will allow us to apply Theorem 1 and, in
some cases, solve in closed form the price competition game between suppliers.
For this purpose, we must solve the buyer's problem, i.e., minimize the buyer's cost under all inventory
policies. This is typically di±cult. It involves describing the steady-state distribution of orders and
inventory positions. Fortunately, when L2 = L1 + 1, Fukuda [7] ¯rst showed that the structure of the
optimal policy is tractable.
At optimality, the buyer uses two target levels b1 and b2 to order in the following way. At the beginning
of period t, demand Dt arrives. Then, if the inventory position at supplier 1, i.e., Y
L1+1
t ¡ Dt, falls below
b1, the manufacturer orders Q1






from supplier 1. Otherwise, no order is placed at
supplier 1. Next, it considers the inventory position at L2, which at this point is equal to Y
L2
t ¡ Dt + Q1
t.
If it is below b2, it orders Q2




t ¡ Dt + Q1
t
´
from supplier 2; otherwise, no order is placed at
supplier 2.
6.1 Optimal Base-Stock Levels
The optimal policy is characterized by two base-stock levels, b1;b2, each for one supplier. Under a double

















This implies that Q1
t + Q2
t = Dt always and thus Y
L2





t¡1 ¡ Dt¡1 + Q1
t¡1, we establish that Y
j


















14In general, we do not obtain a closed-form expression for the inventory position at supplier 1, i.e. Y
L1
t .
Fortunately, this can be done when L2 = L1+1. Interestingly, tractability of the problem coincides exactly
with optimality of base-stock policies for two procurement modes, see Feng et al. [6]. When the two suppli-







= maxf0;Dt ¡ (b2 ¡ b1)g:
Thus, Y
L1
t = maxfb2 ¡Dt¡1;b1g. From these two expressions, we can determine the long-run average cost
for the buyer as a function of b1 and b2, from Equation (1). It is easy to see that if both suppliers are used,














Dt¡i: Y0 is thus simply Y L1
minus the sum of L1 demand realizations, where the stationary distribution of Y L1 is known. Indeed, by
construction, Y L1 = maxfb2 ¡ D;b1g and hence
P(Y L1 = b1) = F(b2 ¡ b1); and
P(Y L1 · q) = F(b2 ¡ q); for q ¸ b1:
By convoluting this distribution with the total demand during L1 periods, we can compute Eh(Y 0) as a
function of b1;b2. When L1 > 0,






















(u + v ¡ b2)f(v)fL1(u)dudv
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= 0. The ¯rst condition yields
dC
db1










Notice that this implies that, when ¢ ¸ hbo, it is best not to order anything with the fast supplier, i.e.,
b1 = ¡1, as we already knew. The second condition is
15dC
db2















= hinv ¡ (hinv + hbo)
µ






or in other words Z 1
v=0




This, plugging in b1 from Equation (6), yields the optimal b2.
When L1 = 0, a straightforward analysis yields that the optimal base-stock for the fast supplier is
b1 = 0, i.e., order for immediate delivery if and only if there is backlog, which is intuitive. In addition,










6.2 Equilibrium Analysis with Immediate Deliveries
In what follows, we consider the speci¯c case L1 = 0 and L2 = 1. This corresponds to the most extreme
situation, where the fast supplier allows immediate delivery, i.e., with no demand risk. Although the
same results can be obtained for L1 > 0, we focus on this simpler case, since the insights obtained are
representative of the general case.
As mentioned above, in this case, the base-stock level for the fast supplier is b1 = 0 when ¢ · hbo, and
b1 = ¡1 otherwise. Through Equation (8), we see that when the di®erence ¢ goes to zero, b2 goes to
the lower bound of the demand, Dmin. Thus ®2 !
Dmin
D
. Note, however, that when ¢ = 0, ®2 = 0, that
is, the market share function ®1 may be discontinuous at ¢ = 0, depending on whether Dmin = 0 or not.



















We can show the following result.
16Lemma 7 If the demand has a non-decreasing failure rate, i.e.,
f
F
is non-decreasing, then the market
share function ®1 is convex in ¢ 2 (0;hbo).
This lemma, together with Lemma 2, implies that when the demand failure rate is non-decreasing, then
the pro¯t function of the slow supplier, 2, is well-behaved.
Similarly, in order to use Lemma 4, we would like to establish that
1
®1
is convex. Unfortunately, the
condition turns out not to be trivial. Thus, the pro¯t function of the fast supplier, 1, may not behave
nicely. The following examples serve as illustrations.











are convex in (0;hbo).
Example 2 When the demand is exponential with rate ¸, then ®1 =
hinv
hinv + ¢











Thus, ®1 is convex and
1
®1
is concave in (0;hbo).
Example 4 When the demand is normal with mean ¹ and standard deviation ¾, then ®1 is convex and
1
®1
is concave in (0;hbo).
Hence, in all four example, we can use Lemmas 3, 5 or 6. Below, we characterize the equilibrium
explicitly for the uniform and exponential distributions, for hbo = 1.





















































² otherwise, there is no equilibrium.
The theorem illustrates that even in the simplest case, for the uniform distribution, we ¯nd situations
where there is no equilibrium. In addition, the theorem provides some insight on the role of the variability
of the distribution on the equilibria.
Namely, given Dmax, when Dmin = 0, the uniform distribution has the largest spread. In that case,
we see that the third case never occurs, as the two ¯rst cases cover every possibility: there is always an
equilibrium. The intuition is that variability reduces the incentive of the fast supplier to outprice the
slow supplier, since the "prize" of capturing the entire market by setting ¢ = 0, compared to the share of
settling for ¢ = ² very small, is zero. Thus, the fast supplier's strategy is more stable (i.e., its best-response
function is continuous) and hence the equilibrium with ¢ > 0 can be reached.
When Dmin ! Dmax, on the other hand, the market share di®erence between ¢ = 0 and ¢ = ² very











Again, the larger the variability, the smaller the set of costs where equilibrium exists.
Figure 4 illustrates the three cases of the theorem, for a uniform distribution in [1;2]:
We present below a similar result for the exponential distribution.























In this case, we observe that there is always an equilibrium. Note that when c1 = c2, the equilibrium is
such that ¢ ¼ 0:62hinv > 0: Thus, it is optimal for the fast supplier not to compete solely in price, trying
to outbid the slow supplier, but rather to charge a premium and share the market with the slow supplier.




































Figure 4: Best response functions p¤
1(p2) and p¤
2(p1) for a uniform demand [1;2], hinv = 1 and a cost
c1 = 20. We see that, depending on the value of c2, we may or may not have an equilibrium. We illustrate




2 = c2 = 21; when
c2 = 16, then we fall into the no-equilibrium case; and when c2 = 5,
c1 ¡ c2
hinv
is large enough, and at
equilibrium ¢ > 0.
































Figure 5: Best response functions p¤
1(p2) and p¤
2(p1) for an exponential demand, hinv = 1 and a cost c1 = 20.
We see that, depending on the value of c2, we have an equilibrium with ¢ = 0 (when c2 = 22), or with
¢ > 0 (when c2 = c1 = 20).
19For the uniform and exponential distributions, when stocking out is very expensive, i.e., hbo = 1,
we have found three possible competitive situations, already identi¯ed in Theorem 1. First, when the
fast supplier is signi¯cantly cheaper than the slow supplier, it will undercut its price and capture all the
market, in the same way as in the Bertrand competition model. Second, when the cost di®erence is
medium, there may be no equilibrium. And third, when the price di®erence is low (could be positive as for
the exponential distribution, or negative as for the uniform), the suppliers stabilize in a situation where
prices are di®erentiated, i.e., ¢ > 0, and share the market. It is also interesting that ¢ grows with c1 ¡c2,
but that it grows less than linearly.
7 Approximation of Equilibria
As we have seen, the market share function ®1 determines completely whether the pricing game has an
equilibrium. In the previous section, we were able to characterize ®1 explicitly, because the inventory
problem is tractable for L2 = L1 + 1. In this section, we develop an approximation for the general case,
for L2 > L1 + 1. First, we assume that the buyer uses a double base-stock inventory policy. Second, we
develop the approximation for ¢ ¼ 0.
As we have seen, ®1 is very steep for small values of ¢: this plays a critical role in the game, as the
steepness represents greater importance of price over the lead time di®erence. Thus, it determines the
incentive of the fast supplier to outbid the slow supplier with a lower price. For this reason, we choose to
develop an approximation of ®1 around ¢ = 0.
In addition, computationally, ®1 is di±cult to calculate for small ¢, since the optimal base-stock levels
for the buyer are very sensitive to ¢. To ¯nd numerically these optimal levels takes a very long time.
Moreover, since optimization requires simulation, to obtain a higher accuracy, the size of the simulation
grows enormously. The asymptotic approximation of the market shares around ¢ = 0 can thus also be
used to alleviate computational e®ort.
We start by observing that, when ¢ > 0 and very small, the slow supplier will receive an order for
Dmin every period, and the fast supplier an order for the rest. Thus
lim










¡®1(¢) for small ¢. For this purpose,
we conducted an extensive simulation for di®erent lead-time parameters, and hinv = 1, hbo = 9. For each
20case, we simulated 50000 period of a uniform demand [0,2] (and hence Dmin = 0, D), and we computed the
average cost of double base-stock policies. Among these, we selected the one that minimized the buyer's
average cost, and this for di®erent ¢ 2 [0;0:1]. We hence calculated ®1 for di®erent ¢. We found that
1 ¡ ®1(¢) varied with ¢b. Figure 6 shows the variation of log(1 ¡ ®1) with log(¢).






































































as a function of log(¢), for various lead-time parameters.
Clearly, we see that the behavior for the cases where L1 = 0 (left) is di®erent to the rest (L1 > 0, right),
as the slopes are around 1 (left) and around 0.5 (right).
Since the relationship was roughly linear, we calculated the slope and intercept of the regression log(1¡
®1) = SLOPE ¢ log(¢) + INTERCEPT. This is summarized in Figure 7.















¡®1(¢) grows with the square-root of ¢. This appeared in all the cases with L1 > 0.
We have performed similar simulations for a truncated normal distribution with ¹ = 1 and ¾ = 0:3,
and we have found similar di®erent behavior between the cases L1 = 0 and L1 > 0.
To explain these two types of behavior, we develop an approximation of the market share function that
indeed identi¯es these two situations. The approximation is detailed in the appendix, but the main steps
21L1 L2 slope intercept
0 1 0.9436 0.4371
0 3 0.9227 -0.0083
0 5 0.8668 -0.2079
1 2 0.4560 -0.2710
1 4 0.5239 -0.5431
1 6 0.4239 -0.9188
2 3 0.4829 0.2097
2 5 0.4228 -0.4020
2 7 0.5640 -0.1791
5 6 0.3743 0.1310
5 8 0.5186 0.0374
5 10 0.4738 -0.1819
Figure 7: Summary of regression coe±cients of log(1 ¡®1) = SLOPE ¢log(¢)+INTERCEPT, for each
of the simulation cases.
are described next. First, we approximate the cost of the buyer as
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b1 ¡ Dt+1 ¡ ::: ¡ Dt+L1
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As a result, the optimal value for b2 ¡ b1 satis¯es
¢ = (hinv + hbo)P
µ











. Equation (10 yields two cases with signi¯cantly di®erent
behavior.




























: We this observe a linear variation of the market share for small ¢, just













Note, however, that when f (Dmin) = 0, the variation is no longer linear. When F (q) ¼ a(q¡Dmin)b,













This situation takes place for distributions such as a truncated normal.









Again, when f (Dmin) > 0, E(q ¡ Dt)
+ ¼ 1


























: This implies that the market share































Thus, we see that the market share of the fast supplier, 1, typically decreases either linearly with ¢,
when L1 = 0, or with the square-root of ¢, when L1 > 0, for small price di®erences, as described by
Equations (11) and (13).
It is interesting to see that the e®ect of inventory cost, hinv + hbo, only plays a role as a scaling factor
of ¢. In addition, the lead time di®erence does not play a role in the approximation, only L1 does.
23In what follows, we compute approximate equilibria, for the case L1 > 0, Dmin = 0. Keeping in mind
that the market share must be positive, the analysis is done for 0 · ¢ ·
hinv + hbo
k2 : Within this range, we
have that ®1 is convex, but it turns out that
1
®1
is neither convex or concave. Thus, we cannot use Theorem































































then there is a unique equilibrium p
eq
1 = c1 and p
eq
2 = c1 ¡
hinv + hbo
k2 , and hence ®1(¢eq) = 0.
The theorem identi¯es the same type of equilibria obtained in Theorem 1. Again, when there is an
equilibrium, either one of the suppliers is wiped out the market (c1 ¡ c2 very large or very small), or both









As we have seen, including lead time considerations into price competition leads to signi¯cantly more
complex results than the ones predicted by the traditional asymmetric Bertrand model. We have identi¯ed
three di®erent equilibrium types, both in the exact and the approximated models. Depending on the range
of costs, and the type of demand distribution, we obtain one sort of equilibrium or another.
(A) When c1 ¡c2 is very small (negative), supplier 1 takes supplier 2 out of the market. The equilibrium
price is p
eq
1 = c2, i.e., the fast supplier prices low enough to put supplier 2 out of business. This is
identical to the standard asymmetric Bertrand result.
(B) When c1 ¡ c2 is medium low, no equilibrium exists. We have observed the result both for the exact
model for the uniform distribution; exact with demand such that 1=®1 is concave, e.g., the normal
demand; and the approximated model.
(C) When c1 ¡c2 is medium high, suppliers share the orders of the buyer, while o®ering di®erent prices.
This situation did not appear in the asymmetric Bertrand result. We have identi¯ed a case where
price di®erentiation is stable, and a higher cost supplier with a lead time advantage can capture some
business, o®ering more expensive express delivery.
(D) When c1 ¡ c2 is very high, the fast supplier cannot o®er a low enough price to be competitive with
the slow supplier. As a result, p
eq
2 is set su±ciently low to ensure that by o®ering p
eq
1 = c1, the fast
supplier does not capture any market share.
One of the questions raised by our results is to understand how to deal with case (B): no equilibrium.
There, the pricing game between the suppliers does not have a set of static pure strategies, that are
unilaterally optimal for the players. The best-response functions to a competitor's price are well-de¯ned,
but do not lead to an equilibrium, as they are discontinuous. In reality, in a dynamic setting, one may see
suppliers moving prices up and down, reacting to each other's prices, and never converging to a stable static
price. Thus, one could analyze the dynamic pricing game, and derive subgame-perfect equilibria. However,
this is technically very challenging, since then the buyer behaves strategically, possibly adopting dynamic
base-stock policies as well. Another option is to consider mixed strategies; this is not appropriate in our
game since we are considering a one-shot game in prices in an in¯nite-horizon replenishment setting and in
such an in¯nite horizon, the player would observe their competitor's price and adjust theirs immediately.
25Hopefully, the other types of equilibria found in the analysis are consistent with academic research as
well as practice. Cases (A) and (D) are examples of deterrence pricing: the most competitive supplier sets
a price so that its competitor cannot pro¯tably enter the market. Case (C) shows that it is stable to have
the fast and expensive supplier charges a premium for fast delivery. In essence, this fast supplier gives up
on competing on low cost and settles for a more reasonable strategy of higher margin and smaller volume.
This type of strategies can be observed in the Adidas and Trigema mentioned in the introduction.
At this point, we would like to point out several extensions to the existing results. First of all, the
in¯nite-horizon average pro¯t analysis can be extended to include the discounted pro¯t case. Also, when
such a long horizon is not consistent with reality, e.g., for short life-cycle products, sourcing with suppliers
with di®erent lead times may be an even more interesting strategy for the buyer, since there is a limited
potential to serve demand with the longer lead time supplier. We hence expect, for the same cost di®erence,
to observe larger price di®erences in equilibrium.
Finally, in our model, we have assumed that there was no ¯xed cost associated with an order. This
naturally lead to using base-stock policies with each supplier. What happens when there are set-up costs?
The buyer would purchase components using an (s;S) policy with each supplier. The pricing game could
be studied in this situation, where the ¯xed charge Ki, the variable cost ci and the lead time Li are given
inputs, and the price pi is the strategy of the supplier.
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28A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If ®1 is convex then
d2®1




= ¡(p2 ¡ c2)
d®2
d¢
+ ®2 = (p2 ¡ c2)
d®1
d¢











Thus ¦2 must be increasing and then decreasing, and hence pseudo-concave.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. When ®1 is convex, using Lemma 2, we have that ¦2(p1;p2) has a unique maximum in (p1¡(L2¡
L1)hbo;p1). Let p0
2 be this maximizer, and let p0
2 = p1 when the maximum is achieved when p2 ! p1, and
p0
2 = p1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo when the maximum is achieved when p2 ! p1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo.
When p1 · c2, it is clear that the best option for supplier 2 is to avoid entering the market, i.e., p2 = c2,
since otherwise it would su®er a loss.
When p1 > c2, it is clearly better to enter the market. There, the function p0
2 can be characterized









. The left-hand side is increasing in p0
2, and the
right-hand side increasing in p1 ¡p0
2. It is clear that, when p1 increases, p0
2 must increase, but not as much
as p1. Thus, the slope of p0
2 is between 0 and 1. Thus, there is a2 such that for p1 · c2 + a2, p0
2 = p1 ¡ ²
and for p1 > c2 + a2, p0
2 < p1.
In addition, ¦2(p1;p0









= ®2 2 [0;1]:
This implies that ¦2(p1;p0
2(p1)) ¸ ¦2(p1;p1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo) = p1 ¡ (L2 ¡ L1)hbo ¡ c2 if and only if
p1 · c2 + e2 for some constant e2. Thus, we have identi¯ed the four cases identi¯ed in the lemma.















= (p1 ¡ c1)
d®1
d¢





















Thus ¦1 must be increasing and then decreasing, and hence pseudo-concave.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. The proof follows exactly the proof of Lemma 3. The only di®erence arises from the fact that, if
®1 is discontinuous at ¢ = 0, then it may be optimal to set p¤
1 = p2 in order to push the slow supplier out
of the market. This is true if and only if ¦1(p2;p2) = p2 ¡ c1 ¸ ¦1(p0
1(p2);p2). As before, ¦1(p0
1(p2);p2)
increases with p2 with slope smaller than 1. Thus, there exists c1 + e1 above which it is optimal to set
p¤
1(p2) = p2, and below which p¤
1(p2) = p0
1(p2). This is a point of discontinuity in p¤
1. Note, that there is
continuity when ®1 is continuous.





+ ®1 = 0;





















A.5 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Clearly, when p2 + (L2 ¡ L1)hbo · c1, we have p¤
1(p2) = c1. Otherwise it is optimal for the fast




is concave, then any point satisfying the ¯rst-order conditions is a minimum of pro¯t. As a
consequence, the best price is either p1 = p2 or p1 = p2 + (L2 ¡ L1)hbo ¡ ². We must hence compare two
30pro¯ts: ¦1(p2;p2) = p2 ¡ c1 and ¦1(p2 + (L2 ¡ L1)hbo ¡ ²;p2) = (p2 + hbo ¡ ² ¡ c1)®1 ((L2 ¡ L1)hbo ¡ ²):
Thus, it is clear that there is c1+e1 above which p¤
1(p2) = p2, and below which p¤
1(p2) = p2+(L2¡L1)hbo¡².
A.6 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. In order to ¯nd equilibrium, we must look for the intersection points of the curves characterized













2 < (L2 ¡L1)hbo. Clearly, the ¯rst two
cases only happen when one of the suppliers drives the other out of the market. The third case takes place
when c1 + a1 < p2 · c1 + e1 and c2 + a2 < p1 · c2 + e2, together with ensuring that the curves p0
1 and p0
2









have an intersection if and only if lim²!0+ p¤
1(c1 + e1 ¡ ²) ¡ (c1 + e1) · (c2 + e2) ¡ lim²!0+ p¤
2(c2 + e2 ¡ ²).
It is clear that all these equilibria are unique.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 7












































A.8 Proof of Theorem 2







(see Example 1). Thus, ®1 and
1
®1




31First, the best-response function of supplier 1 is characterized by a1 = ¡1, for p2 · c1 + e1, p¤
1(p2) =








(condition where the pro¯t of setting p1 = c1 + e1 and using p1 = p0












Second, the best-response function of supplier 2 is continuous, p¤
2(p1) = c2 for p1 · c2, and increasing
for p1 > c2.







: The second case never occurs, as hbo = 1. The third case corresponds to the













































































With this, we have identi¯ed the situation corresponding to case three in Theorem 1. In any other case
besides this and c1 ¡ c2 · ¡e1, there is no equilibrium.
32A.9 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. For the exponential distribution distribution, ®1 =
hinv
hinv + ¢




First, the best-response function of supplier 1 is characterized by a1 = ¡1, e1 = hinv, and for p2 ·
c1 + e1, p¤
1(p2) = 1: Thus, there can be no equilibrium when p2 < c1 + e1. When p2 = c1 + e1, then any
price p1 above p2 yields the same pro¯t to supplier 1.
Second, the best-response function of supplier 2 is continuous, p¤
2(p1) = c2 for p1 · c2, and increasing
for p1 > c2.
Again, the ¯rst case of Theorem 1 corresponds to c2 ¸ c1 + e1. Since hbo = 1, the second case of
the theorem never occurs. The third case corresponds to p2 = c1 + e1 = c1 + hinv. In that situation, the







































A.10 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let a =
k
hinv + hbo
. Since we are interested in situations with small ¢, we consider that ¢ <




















































when p1 ¡ c2 ·
3
a2, and p2 = p1 ¡
1
a2, otherwise.
On the other hand, supplier 1 may consider three strategies and select the best:
33(1) p1 = p2, yielding ¦1 = p2 ¡ c1;
(2) or ¯nd the unique price that satis¯es the ¯rst-order condition
p








a2 ¡ 3(p2 ¡ c1);
when the square root is well-de¯ned and the corresponding market share is non-negative;
(3) or p1 = c1, yielding ¦1 = 0.
Figure 8 shows the pro¯t ¦1 for di®erent parameters of a. We see that options (1) or (2) are better
depending on the values of a.

















Figure 8: Plots of supplier 1 pro¯t ¦ 1 as a function of p1, for di®erent parameters of a and c1 = 10, p2 = 11.
We observe that depending on the value of a, we may select p¤
1 = p2 or p¤
1 > p2, with a discontinuous jump





It turns out that the second option is the best for supplier 1 if and only if




The ¯rst option is to capture all the market by outbidding supplier 2, and it corresponds to p2 > c1 +
1
4a2:
The third option corresponds to the situation where p2 < c1 ¡
1
a2. Figure 9 shows the best-response
function of supplier 1 as a function to p2. We clearly identify option (1) for large p2. Then, after a jump,
option (2) is the most advantageous. Finally, for smaller p2, the best choice is (3): p1 = c1.
















Figure 9: Best-response function p¤
1(p2) for supplier 1 when a = 1 and c1 = 10. Observe that for prices p2
below 9, the best response is to price at cost, with a resulting market share of 0, since ¢ ¸ 1=a2.
With the best-response functions, we compute the price equilibria of the system. We have four cases
to consider.
When a2(c1 ¡c2) · ¡
1
4
; i.e., when the slow supplier has a cost c2 signi¯cantly higher than c1, it is not




2 = c2. Thus, when
a is very large, we obtain a result similar to the asymmetric Bertrand competition model.
The second possible case is that no equilibrium exists: supplier 1 prices supplier 2 out of the market









which captures the case when both suppliers have the same cost.
Finally, the third possibility is that both suppliers obtain a positive market share. This occurs when
1
4
· a2(c1 ¡ c2) · 3:












p2 = c2 + 2¢;
p1 = p2 + ¢:
35Finally, there is a last case when
a2(c1 ¡ c2) ¸ 3:
Here, the cost di®erence is so large that supplier 1 cannot compete and is thrown out of the market
completely. Thus, p
eq







B Derivation of Market Share Approximation
Below, we detail how we obtain the approximation presented in Section 7.
When ¢ = 0, the double base-stock policy is optimal. Indeed, the base-stock level of supplier 1 is equal
to the level of the newsboy, when supplier 1 is the only supplier and the demand is equal to Dt ¡ Dmin.
Thus, at ¢ = 0, the optimality equation is
P
³






Also, b2 = b1 + (L2 ¡ L1)Dmin is the optimal level for supplier 2. This guarantees that supplier 2
delivers exactly Dmin at every period.
Consider now that how ®1 varies for ¢ > 0. Supplier 2 is used in small quantities above Dmin. That
is, using a base-stock policy, b2 > b1 + (L2 ¡ L1)Dmin. The amount to be shipped from supplier 2 is on
average around (b2 ¡ b1)=(L2 ¡ L1) per period. This is because the amount of stock in transit is equal to
b2 ¡ Y
L1
t ¼ b2 ¡ b1, and the transit time L2 ¡ L1.
In these conditions, the event of having an inventory position at supplier 1 larger than b1 has a very
small probability of happening. Our approximation is based on the assumption that two such events never
occur in two consecutive periods. Intuitively, this occurs when the order placed at t ¡ (L2 ¡ L1) (due to
arrive and used to serve demand at t+L1) is larger than the demand Dt. Thus, the inventory position for
supplier 1 is b1¡Dt+Q2
t¡(L2¡L1) > b1. Approximately, this occurs with probability equal to the stationary
probability of Dt · Q2
t¡(L2¡L1); which is very small when ¢ ¼ 0. In this situation, the order placed at
supplier 1 is 0, and the order placed at supplier 2 is Dt.
When, on the other hand, Dt > Q2
t¡(L2¡L1); then the order placed at supplier 1 is Dt ¡Q2
t¡(L2¡L1) and
at supplier 2 Q2
t¡(L2¡L1).
We can rewrite Equation (1), where we will take conditional expectations on Dt > Q2
t¡(L2¡L1) or
36Dt · Q2
t¡(L2¡L1). We count the purchasing cost at t and the inventory cost taken at t + L1.
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9
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As we said, this can be approximated by
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We can combine both equations and obtain, on the one hand, FL1 (b1) =
hinv + ¢
hinv + hbo




































= (hinv + hbo)P
µ
b1 · Dt+1 + ::: + Dt+L1 · b1 +
b2 ¡ b1
L2 ¡ L1
¡ Dt
¶
37